We present an original computational method for the identification of prime implicants (PIs) 
INTRODUCTION
The reliability analysis of systems with significant hardware/software/human interactions is difficult, because the response of the system under accidental scenarios depends on the time of occurrence and on the magnitude of the events [1; 2] . Further, it turns out that the logic of these systems can give rise to non-coherent structure functions, where both failed and working states of the same components can lead the system to failure [3] ; for example, if in a system made up of three components J, K, L it fails with components states (J, L , K), with the negation sign indicating that the component is failed, whereas it is working when the components states are (J , L , K), then the system is non-coherent. The traditional Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) modeling tools, e.g. Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis, have difficulties in including the specific timing and magnitude of the events. On the other hand, so-called dynamic reliability methods can complement the traditional methods to accounts for the interactions among the physical parameters of the processes (temperature, pressure, speed, etc.), the human operators actions and the failures of the components [2;4-6] and to identify the system prime implicants (PIs), i.e., the event product terms that render true the structure function and that cannot be covered by more reduced implicants [7] , even if the structure functions are non-coherent 1 .
3 to prevent system failure, for example by forcing failure of component L when component J and K have already failed [10] .
Fault tree analysis is undoubtedly an useful and efficient tool for minimal cut set identification, but not for PIs identification, since it can only deal with coherent structure functions [11] . The problem of extending the analysis to non-coherent fault trees has, then, been tackled in different ways: the simplification of non-coherent structure functions expressed in canonical forms has been raised by [7] and solved by [12] , allowing a preliminary identification of PIs; the problem has also been tackled by means of graphical methods such as Karnaugh maps [13] . However, the actual implementation of these methods becomes very time-consuming when the number of variables involved in the given structure function increases. The computational efficiency has been improved resorting to various Partitioned List algorithms [14] and fast Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) algorithms [15] : in [16] , a modification of a minimal cut sets algorithm known as Simple Prime Implicant Set Algorithm is proposed, although it does not always produce complete PI sets, whereas in [17] a method is proposed to convert the fault tree of a non-coherent structure function into a BDD for PIs identification, where each of the basic events of the tree is represented as a node with two branches (branch 1 and 0, corresponding to the component failure and working states respectively). This latter approach has been adapted in [18] for PI identification based on Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM).
The difficulty in developing efficient computational methods for PIs identification lays in the fact that this can be seen as an NP-hard problem of covering a set (the minterms) with elements from given subsets (the PIs) [19] : each given subset has an associated cost proportional to its dimension and the objective of the problem is to choose the smallest group of subsets whose union contains the whole set with minimal cost, as we shall see in what follows.
In this paper, we develop a new method for identifying all PIs of a non-coherent structure function resorting to the powerful evolutionary algorithm of Differential Evolution (DE) [20] . The PIs are found by solving by DE a properly defined optimization problem, for determining the exact (not approximated) solution of the Set Covering Problem (SCP) [21; 22] : in this way, none of the prime (minimal) failure scenarios (i.e., the PIs) can be neglected by the identification method.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the artificial case study used to generate the scenarios for the dynamic reliability analysis is presented. In Section 3, the model of a Steam Generator (SG) of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is presented [23] . In Section 4, PIs identification is formulated as an optimization problem and tackled by resorting to the DE-based approach. In Section 5, the results of the application of the approach to the scenarios of the artificial case and of the SG are presented.
Conclusions and remarks are given in Section 6. 4 We take signal 1 as the safety-relevant parameter to be monitored against pre-defined safety thresholds: if it exceeds the upper threshold value of 2.5, the system fails in the "High" end state; if it decreases below the lower threshold value of -1.5, the system end state is "Low" [25] . In fails to open during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), an in-vessel temperature growth is measured, which could arrive at exceeding the upper threshold [26] ; if the pressurizer safety relief valve fails to close, the water level drops below the low-level safety threshold, leading the system into the undesirable state of uncovered electric heaters [27] .
THE ARTIFICIAL CASE STUDY
Yet, it is important to underline that the procedure implemented in this work for sampling the fault events is not intended to reproduce the actual stochastic failure behavior of the components of a real system; rather, the choices and hypotheses for modeling the faults (e.g. system life, number of faults and distributions of failure times and magnitudes) have been arbitrarily made with the aim of favoring multiple failures in the sequences and capturing the dynamic influence of their order, timing and 6 magnitude including possible compensatory effects for which a failure later in time compensates for the impact of another earlier failure, thus highlighting non-coherent system behavior. 
Non-coherence
Considering the binary (safe or faulty) states of the five components of the system, the number of possible system configurations is equal to 32. One simulation has been run for each system configuration with the hypothesis that faults are assumed to occur at the beginning of the scenarios and their magnitudes are taken equal to their mean values of Tab. 2. Tab. 3 shows the truth-table of the system, i.e., all possible system configurations, with the end state "Low" or "High" they lead to. The analysis of the truth-table points out that the system failure logic is represented by a non-coherent structure function. In fact, as it can be shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 , both failed and working states of the components can contribute to the failure of the system. In particular, in Fig is plotted: from 11 to 17, adding the failure of component A brings the system from a "Low" end state to a "Safe" end state, violating coherence requirements.
In Fig. 3 (left) , the safety-relevant signal 1 for the system configuration 6 of Tab. 3 (component E failed, and components A, B, C and D working) is shown; on the other hand, in Fig. 3 (right) the same signal for system configuration 15 of Tab. 3 (components C and E failed, and components A, B and D working) is plotted: from 6 to 15, adding the failure of component C brings the system from a "High" end state to a "Safe" end state, violating coherence requirements. Furthermore, when we take into account uncertainties on timing and magnitudes of components failures, the dynamic aspects render non-coherence even more evident. Fig. 4 shows the frequency of the three system end states ("High", Safe and "Low") for the 32 system configurations reported in Tab. 3, estimated from the simulation of 10,000 accidental scenarios for each system configuration with random components failure times and magnitudes. Most of the configurations do not lead unequivocally to one end state: on one side, this means that even though the configuration is the same, when the failures of the components occur at different times or with different magnitudes, the end state can be different. For example, if a failure occurs towards the end of the mission time (as opposed to the start of the period), it may not lead to system failure [24] . On the other side, Fig. 4 These examples show the need in dynamic reliability analysis to focus on the PIs of the system, rather than on the identification of its minimal cut sets, due to the evident non-coherence of the structure function. 
THE STEAM GENERATOR OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
The U-Tube Steam Generator (UTSG) under consideration is sketched in 
Fig 5. Schematic of the UTSG [29]
At low , "swell and shrink" phenomena are also modeled to reproduce the dynamic behavior of the SG: when increases, the steam pressure in the steam dome decreases and the two-phase fluid in the tube bundle expands causing to initially swell (i.e., rise), instead of decreasing as would have been expected by the mass balance; contrarily, if decreases or increases, a shrink effect occurs [29] . A similar model has been presented in [23] .
The goal of the system is to maintain the SG water level at a reference position ( ): the SG fails if the rises (falls) above (below) the threshold, ℎ ℎ ( ), in which case automatic reactor or turbine trips are triggered. Indeed, if the exceeds ℎ ℎ , the steam separator and dryer lose their functionality and excessive moisture is carried in , degrading the turbine blades profile and the turbine efficiency; if decreases below , insufficient cooling capability of the primary fluid occurs. Similarly, the , is relevant for the cooling capability of the primary circuit [29] .
A dedicated, simulation model has been implemented in SIMULINK to simulate the dynamic response of the UTSG at different values. Both feedforward and feedback digital control schemes have been adopted. The feedback controller is a PID that provides a flow rate resulting from the residuals between and , whereas the feedforward controller consists in a safety relief valve that is opened if and only if exceeds the ℎ , and removes a constant flow safety flow rate ( ).
The block diagram representing the SIMULINK model of the SG is shown in Fig. 6 : the controlled variable is , whereas the control variable is .
Fig 6. Block diagram representing the SIMULINK model of the SG.

The set of possible failures
We assume component failures to occur at the beginning of the scenario (with equal to 4000 (s)) [1] . We here analyze the system in constant =80% Pn scenarios with respect to high level failure Considering the binary (safe or faulty) states of the five components of the system, the number of possible system configurations (for which a simulation has been run) is equal to 16. Tab. 4 shows the truth-table of the system, i.e., all possible system configurations, with the end state "Low" or "High" they lead to. The analysis of the truth-table points out that the system failure logic is represented by a non-coherent structure function. In fact, as it can be shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 , both failed and working states of the components can contribute to the failure of the system. In particular, in Fig. 7 (left) the level for system configuration 2 (steam valve failure) is shown; on the other hand, in Fig. 7 (right) the level for system configuration 6 (steam and safety valves failures) is plotted: adding the failure of the safety valve brings the system from a "High" end state to a "Safe" end state, violating coherence requirements.
In Fig. 8 
A NOVEL METHOD FOR PIs IDENTIFICATION
In this paper, the problem of PIs identification is innovatively handled resorting to the DE algorithm for solving a set covering problem (SCP) [22; 30] . Differently from [30] , here we develop a DE search strategy to identify PIs and not the classical MCSs. The SCP is the problem of covering at minimal cost (that is defined depending on the context of the application) the columns of a zero-one matrix (hereafter called chromosome within the differential evolution (DE) optimization method that will be adopted) that is a hypothetical solution of the optimization problem (4) and (5) . A value of 1 in the i-th vector position xi implies that the implicant i is chosen to be in the cover; a value of 0, otherwise [19] .
For clarification, let us consider the system made up by three components (J, K and L) whose reliability block diagram is shown in Fig. 9 . The C= 5 minterms mj that lead this system to failure are reported in Tab. 5. Fig. 9 (1=failed component, 0=safe component) The R=11 implicants (xi in Eqs. (4) and (5)) of the system of Fig. 9 , and their costs (wi in Eq. (4)), are reported in Tab. 6. Intuitively, the PIs of the system of Fig. 9 are x10 and x11. In Tab. 7, the implicant chart A, whose rows are aij in Eq. (5), for the system is finally shown. Table 7 . Implicant chart A for the system of Fig.9 (aij=1, minterm is covered, aij=0, minterm is uncovered) Within the evolutionary algorithm context, the optimal cover opt x is the chromosome (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1) x  which means that only x10 and x11 are chosen to be in the solution, i.e., are PIs.
For solving the above-defined SCP, we resort to Differential Evolution (DE), which belongs to the class of Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) [32] . A main advantage of DE with respect to other EAs is the fact that the evolutionary operations used in DE are specifically built for optimization over continuous spaces and based on a floating-point representation [33] [34] [35] .
DE entails three phases called mutation, crossover and selection. This is the original scheme proposed in [20] : at the G+1-th generation, for each gene xi in the chromosome vector 
where U(0,1] denotes the uniform continuous random value in (0, 1] and irand(R) is a uniform discrete random number from the set   1,2,..., R , where R is the length of the chromosome.
The trial vector obtained 1 G u  , then, enters the selection process where it is compared with (and eventually substitutes) the target vector G x that is partially its parent according to the crossover rule.
Referring to minimization, if the fitness, i.e., the cost, of 1 G u  is less than the fitness of , the first will be a member of the next generation G+1, replacing the target vector, and the trial vector is
In this work, we aim at comparing the performance of two different DEs, that differ in the mutation step and are called "Binary Differential Evolution" (BDE) [33] and "Modified Binary Differential
Evolution" (MBDE) [34] .
Binary Differential Evolution
BDE is based on a mapping operator, defined as Eq. (9), that is constructed to map the gene xi in a discrete domain (in our case it is a binary domain) into a continuous domain by partitioning the After variable xi is mapped in the new domain, the mutation operator of Eq. (6) is applied. To ensure that the resulting gene generated by the mutation operator in the original DE falls into the interval [0,1], a sigmoid function is applied to obtain vi:
Before the crossover phase, an inverse mapping operator is used:
Then, the procedure follows traditional DE steps of crossover and selection.
Modified Binary Differential Evolution
MBDE is based on the mutation phase of the standard DE: it entails embedding Eq. (6) into a probability estimation operator (Eq. (12) Therefore, at least one bit of the trial individual is inherited from the mutant individual so that MBDE is able to avoid duplication individuals and effectively search within the neighborhood [34] . Then, the procedure follows the traditional selection step.
RESULTS
The artificial case study
Without loss of generality, we present our analysis on the "Low" end state. From the truth -table of Tab. 3, we can identify all the C=13 minterms that make the system fail, listed in Tab. 8. These are the 13 columns mj, j=1, 2, ..., 13, of the implicants chart A that have to be covered by the PIs we aim at identifying. The rows xi, i.e., the complete set of implicants of the system structure function, of the implicant chart A are listed in Tab. 9. 
Tab 9. List of the implicants xi of the system
The optimal cover opt x is the one for which the cost function Eq. (4) is minimized. Different approaches can be tailored for penalizing incomplete solutions (solutions that do not cover all faulty minterms), taking into account that assigning them a very high cost (for example the cost of all implicants) do not differentiate between extremely bad solutions (those who cover only a few minterms) and almost optimal ones (those that cover almost all minterms at a very low cost) [19] .
In this work, we adopted two different cost functions for this, namely "Penalty" [19] and "One complement" [36] . The "Penalty" fitness function is the sum of the costs of the chosen implicants plus, in case the chosen implicants do not cover all the faulty minterms, an extra cost of i w  , with α=1.25, for each i-th implicant that should be added for a complete cover. So, when the chosen implicants do not cover all the faulty minterms, the function resorts to a sequential search starting at the first implicant and including all implicants needed to cover all the minterms. With the "One complement" fitness function, the cost of the trial solution is mapped into a binary fitness function made up by two parts: the most important digits are determined as the complement to one of the uncovered faulty minterms, while the least important digits are determined as the complement to one of the sum of the costs of the implicants included in the trial solution. In this way, we obtain that a complete subset of PIs that covers all faulty minterms has for sure a larger fitness than any other incomplete subset. It is important to underline that with the "Penalty" fitness function we aim at minimizing the cost of Eq. (4), whereas with the "One complement" fitness function we aim at the maximization of the cost.
In this case study, the fitness value corresponding to the true optimal solution opt x is equal to 21 when using the "Penalty" fitness function and to 4074 when using the "One Complement" fitness function.
The true solution opt x is found using the Quine-McCluskey algorithm that gives a deterministic way to check that the minimal form of a Boolean function has been reached [12] . This is a tabular method that compares each minterm with all the other minterms: if two of them differ in only one variable, that variable is removed and a reduced (merged) implicant is formed; the merging process is repeated for all the minterms until the cycle yields no further elimination of variables; the remaining implicants are thus selected as the PIs [7; 12] . Although more practical than Karnaugh maps when dealing with more than four variables, the Quine-McCluskey algorithm also has a limited range of use since the problem it solves is NP-hard: the runtime of the Quine-McCluskey algorithm grows exponentially with the number of variables. However, in this artificial case study, it is able to provide the optimal PIs opt x as listed in Tab. 10, where each row represents one of the 7 PIs of this problem.
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State of component B
State of component C
State of component D
State of component E
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X , working () X or it is irrelevant (-) as contributor to the PI)
It is worth mentioning that, if we would have been searching for traditional MCSs rather than PIs (like in [30] ), the actual behavior of the system would not have been straightforwardly identified and the system could have been be exposed to (avoidable) risk states. For example, let us consider the PI1
of Table 10 (where component C is failed, components B and E are working, and the states of components A and D do not influence the system end state). If component B (or E) is failed the system end state should remain "Failed", if we assume coherence of the system. On the contrary, due to the 22 non-coherence of the analyzed system, if component E fails and the state of component B does not change, the end state of the system is "Safe" (as shown by system configuration 15 in Table 3 ) rather than "Failed". Therefore, the analysis of the identified PIs would suggest that, in order to avoid system failure, component E could be forced to fail as a counteracting measure to component C failure; this conclusion could not be reached with a MCS analysis.
The results by MBDE and BDE with the different fitness functions "Penalty" and "One
Complement", ˆo -Success rate: percentage of trials for which the true optimum opt x is found.
-Accuracy (λ): the larger λ, the larger the accuracy of the solution [37] . 
MBDE Results
We solve the set covering problem (SCP) defined in Section 4 on the problem of Section 2 using an MBDE software developed by LASAR (Laboratorio di Analisi di Segnale e Analisi di Rischio) at the Politecnico di Milano (www.lasar.cesnef.polimi.it). Parameters F (see Eq. (6)) and CR (see Eq. (7)) are optimized through a trial and error procedure and to the values reported in Tab. 11, for the MBDE with "Penalty" and "One complement" fitness functions. shows that with the "Penalty" fitness function the algorithm is faster than with the "One complement"
fitness function, mainly because of its more straightforward computation. Obviously, the Cpu indicator performance worsens when the number of chromosomes in the population becomes larger.
BDE and GA Results
For comparison, we solve the same set covering problem (SCP) using a BDE toolbox and a Genetic With respect to MBDE, BDE and GA need a large population to obtain a good success rate (i.e., success rate ≥85% if NP=300 for BDE and GA (Table 20) , whereas NP=30 for MBDE (Table 12) );
indeed, the probability estimation operator embedded into the MBDE (Eq. (12)) can provide superior global searching ability and avoid the optimization getting trapped into a local optimum, because the BDE mutation mechanism has a higher probability of producing a bit of value 1 in the evolution process that restricts the search diversity of the optimum solution [38] . On the other hand, in MBDE at least one bit of the trial individual is inherited from the mutant individual, so that it is able to avoid duplication individuals and effectively search within the neighborhood [34] .
The success rate is better for BDE compared to GA when the population considered is small (see Tables 18 and 19 , NP=30,100, respectively), whereas GA becomes better as the population increases (see Tables 20 and 21 , NP=300,500, respectively); Success rate for BDE and GA is comparable to that of MBDE only with a population of NP=500 (see Tables 21 and 12 , respectively). Concerning the Cpu performance, BDE is better than GA (see 3  rd row of Tables 18 to 21 ), whereas it is slightly worse when compared to MBDE (see 3  rd row of Tables 18 to 21, left, in comparison with 3  rd row   Tables 12 to 15 ). Also in these cases, the Cpu shows a superior performance with the "Penalty" fitness function compared with the "One complement", and worsens when the number of chromosomes in the population becomes larger (see 3 rd row, 2 nd and 3 rd column of Tables 18 to 21 ). These simulations underline the fact that for a smaller population BDE has a higher accuracy in terms of success rate and computational time, whereas when the population is increased GA outperforms BDE in terms of accuracy of the results. These differences are driven by the ability of DE to explore efficiently the search space, even with a small population thanks to its particular mutation phase [33; 34] .
Confidence on the results
Compared to MBDE results, BDE and GA do not converge to the true solution opt x for all the 20 trials (i.e., in Tables 12 to 15 , even with NP=30, success rate for MBDE is equal to 100%, whereas Tables 18 to 21 highlight that BDE and GA need NP≥300 for achieving success rate equal to 100%).
In Fig. 10 In particular, Fig. 10 (left) and Fig. 11 (left) show the probability mass functions of the ˆo pt x fitness values when the algorithm is implemented with the "Penalty" fitness function; the right probability mass functions correspond to when the algorithm is implemented with the "One complement" fitness function. Moreover, it can be seen the sensitivity of the results provided by BDE and GA on the population size NP can be seen: the increase of the number of individuals in the population moves the mean fitness value of the population towards the fitness value of opt x , and the increase of the number of individuals in the population and the use of the "Penalty" function gives rise to distributions that are shrinked on the best fitness value, which makes the result more reliable. In all cases (MBDE, BDE and GA), the optimization algorithm may be challenged by the timing and order of the sequences of component failure events, and the number of system components. In the analytical case study, for example, the behavior of the system must be accurately modelled in order to be able to handle the set covering problem and, thus, to capture the influence of the timing and order of the sequences of component failure events on the determination of the PIs set, without reducing the DE searching capability. On the other hand, as the number of system components increases, the MBDE, BDE and GA methods can be challenged: in this case, an efficient and accurate PIs set determination can be achieved by a hierarchical method of a multi-steps DE optimization, as shown in [30] . Finally, if the system shows a large number of implicants (i.e., accident sequences), it might become necessary to prioritize the PIs search towards those accident sequences that are more meaningful with respect to the system end state of interest, instead of focusing on the whole implicants set, as done in [39] , where authors present a visual interactive method for PI identification rather than resorting to the solution of a SCP.
The UTSG case study
From the truth- We solve the SCP defined in Section 4 on the problem of Section 3 using an MBDE software whose parameters F (see Eq. (6)) and CR (see Eq. (7)) are optimized through a trial and error procedure and set to the values reported in Tab. 24, for the MBDE with "Penalty" and "One complement" fitness functions. In both cases, the application of the MBDE provides the list of PIs for the UTSG, as listed in Again, it is worth noting that the non-coherence of the system, and the difference between MCSs and PIs can be pointed out by analyzing the PIs in Table 25 . Indeed, for example, PI1 of Table 25 shows that the outlet steam valve is failed (T ̅ ), the safety relief valve is working (U) and the states of Level sensor-PID controller communication and of the PID controller components are irrelevant to the end state of the steam generator. However, due to the non-coherence of the system, as soon as the steam valve fails, the safety relief valve could be forced to fail in order to have a safe end state of the steam generator (as shown by system configuration 16 in Table 4 ).
CONCLUSIONS
The reliability analysis of dynamic systems calls for the complementation of traditional PRA methods by dynamic reliability methods. For such systems, the sequence and timing of the events in a scenario is relevant and can give rise to non-coherent structure functions, in which failed and working states of the same components can lead the system to failure. Then, traditional minimal cut set analysis cannot be applied and prime implicants identification becomes the only way.
In this paper, the problem of prime implicants identification has been treated as an optimization problem aimed at finding the minimum combination of implicants that can guarantee the best coverage of all the minterms which fail the system. For this, we have developed a new technique to find PIs of a non-coherent structure function resorting to MBDE. The results have been compared with those obtained by BDE and GA.
It has been shown that MBDE has superior performances in terms of computational time and accuracy of the results (i.e., success rate for the convergence to the true solution) compared to BDE and GA, and performs very well even with a small population. Thanks to its more straightforward implementation, the "One complement" fitness function requires less time compared to the "Penalty" fitness function and gives a more robust PI identification, as verified by the success rate of the search results provided by BDE and GA. The ability of the method in PI identification has been confirmed with respect to a dynamic Steam Generator (SG) of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).
